Category: Academic integrity

Categories
Academic integrity Modes of propaganda Radicalisation Terror

ASPI demonstrates its allegiance to arms manufacturers and US and UK governments

On the 12th of April, ASPI (Australian Strategic Policy Institute) launched the annual report by the IEP (Institute for Economics & Peace). The report gives credible data on global terrorism, with its key publication being the ranking of countries according to the impact that terrorism has had on it.

One wonders why the IEP needs ASPI to launch its report, as IEP director Dr David Hammond did little more than simply highlight various elements of the report. Expert contributions were interesting but did not really add much to the report except, perhaps, to give perspectives from other countries; which, of course, does nothing to change the underlying facts of terrorism.

Based on the report and those before it (back to 2014), I asked a question at the launch which was completely relevant and addressed the successes and failures of counter-terrorism, as objectively shown in the data. This is the question.

In 2014, we find 4 countries in a comparable position on the GTI – US, UK, China, and Indonesia, at around rank 30. This indicates significant challenges in managing terrorism in those countries. Australia was ranked 95, an enviable position to be in.

If we consider the UK, we find that from 2014 to 2022, the rank stays stubbornly on 30 + or – 2. The US position drifts gradually down to rank 20, indicating that terrorism in this country increased. Only in the last 3 years has this improved, mostly in line with global trends.

Meanwhile, Australia plunged 36 places from 2014 to 2015, still much more favorable than both the US and UK but has, as with the UK and US, stayed stubbornly at around 60. Indonesia shows a steady rise until 2018 when it starts to drop in line with global trends.

The miraculous story is China. From a low 25 (below US, UK, and Indonesia), China has steadily risen, year on year, through the rankings to now be 67th place, passing Australia.

This represents a change of 42 positions over 8 years.

China’s record can only be described, objectively, as incredibly successful. Its program of clear intent, selective detention, surveillance, poverty alleviation, economic development and strong determination has produced results that are, surely, the envy of the world.

In view of the relentless campaign by western media, academics, and ASPI to discredit this achievement, can you reflect on why you think ASPI has taken such a negative line and whether, in the final assessment, their campaign against China has been grounded in poor research and lack of objectivity?

There was a mistake in the question that was a result of accidentally writing what I intended for an earlier paragraph. I should have written “Indonesia shows a steady rise until 2018 when it starts to drop, against global trends.” In any case, this was a minor point, included to show that other large Asian countries still face a challenge.

In graphic form, this looks like:

The question goes directly to the issue that is obvious. Despite incredible expenditure and political posturing, the UK and US have been singularly unsuccessful in combatting terrorism while China, in contrast, has been spectacularly successful. Time to celebrate that one country has found a way of keeping its citizens safe.

My question was the first to be put but Katja Theodorakis, Head of Counterterrorism Program made the decision to censor it on behalf of ASPI and its sponsors – US arms manufacturers and two foreign governments – UK and US. One wonders how the ASPI program can be labelled as ‘counterterrorism’ when those involved in the program demonstrate contempt for real discussion on major successes.

In line with the dishonesty and complete lack of integrity that ASPI displays as its normal mode of operation, this launch proved to be a complete farce. As global conflicts and climate change make ever increasing demands on populations, providing ample breeding grounds for terrorism, ignoring successes and failing to properly analyse the basis of their success will be at our own peril.

Categories
Academic integrity Anti-China Narratives Modes of propaganda Terror

Occasional shorts – #4

In this edition, I will take a detour from the new report called “The architecture of repression” by Xu @xu_xiuzhong, Leibold @jleibold and Daria Impiombato.

Today, I return to Michael Clarke, whose scholarly work underpins much of the reports and articles regarding China and Xinjiang. Of particular interest is Clarke’s “Widening the net: China’s anti-terror laws and human rights in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region“. The central thesis of this paper, written in 2010, is that China has sacrificed human rights for security in relation to terrorism. Throughout the paper, general references to global initiatives related to terrorism do not use the ironic indicators of single quotes. For example, he writes

Domestically, the ‘war on terror’ has permitted China to not only deploy significant repressive force, in political, legal and police/military terms, to confront the perceived threat to Xinjiang’s security posed by Uyghur terrorism but also to establish the political and legal framework through which to confront any future challenges to state power.

Note the acknowledgement of Uyghur terrorism – indicated by the simple unironic adjective. Quite ‘accidentally’, on many occasions, Clarke affirms that terrorism may in fact be just that. However, in a most confused way, as Clarke begins to talk about China’s response, he uses (on 14 instances – there are many other instances of usage in phrases or other forms) the ironic ‘terrorism’, indicating scepticism.

Indeed, by the end of the paper, a reasonable reader would conclude that Clarke does not believe any terrorism at all had occurred and that Beijing had simply adopted a repressive mode, seemingly towards nearly everything.

Notably absent from Clarke’s assessment is a comparative analysis of counter-terrorist modes and counter-terror theory, probably due to the fact that this is certainly not his area of expertise and he speaks with no more authority than a CNN journalist. In particular, he is silent on the insidious influence of Salafist extremism that spread throughout Central and South East Asia. This silence, in view of his historical expertise, is unforgivable, and puts a large question mark on what he might be intending with this paper.

Also absent is any attempt to ascertain what Uyghur people might actually think of the policy. Like so many of the white men who speak on behalf of those in developing countries, ignoring their agencies, Clarke is happy to posit, without evidence, some kind of universal Uyghur identity that conveniently supports separatism, Salafist extremism and violent independence movements. In this paternalistic endeavour, Clarke joins fellow academics purporting to speak on behalf of Uyghurs.

Of course, Clarke’s thesis was demonstrated, in the subsequent terror attacks in Xinjiang, to be completely misguided.

My suggestion to Michael is that he “pull is head in” and stick to subject matter over which he has some control and knowledge and avoid the trend in academia to signal one’s liberal views by China bashing.

Categories
Academic integrity Deradicalisation Replacement theory

Occasional shorts – #3

@ASPI_org has produced a new report called “The architecture of repression” by Xu @xu_xiuzhong, Leibold @jleibold and Daria Impiombato. I will be analysing this document in the next few weeks.

Also checkout my previous shorts. Occasional shorts – #1 and Occasional shorts – #2 where I deconstruct Michael Clarke’s contributions to the repression narrative and his indulgence in Replacement Theory.

Reference 1

title = The case of the missing indigene: debate over a second-generation ethnic policy

context = indigenous groups1

note =  (long) The Chinese party-state officially recognises 56 minzu groups in China: a single Han majority and 55 numerically much smaller groups that currently make up nearly 9% of China’s population. The term minzu is deeply polysemic and notoriously difficult to translate. Depending on the context of its use, the term can connote concepts similar to nation, race, people and ethnicity in English. Party officials initially used the English term ‘nationality’ to render the term into English. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the party gradually pivoted away from ‘nationality’, preferring the term ‘ethnic minorities’ for the non-Han groups and reserving the term ‘nation’ for the collective identity and name of the Chinese nation-race’. See James Leibold, The minzu net: China’s fragmented national form,’ Nations and Nationalism, 2016, 22(3):425-428.

While party officials reject any assertion of indigeneity in China, Harvard historian Mark Elliott argues that China’s non-Han peoples are better thought of as indigenous communities rather than as ‘ethnic minorities’, which is a term widely used to refer to migrant populations in places such Canada or Australia, as these groups:

continue to live on lands to which they have reasonably strong ancestral claims; in their encounter with the majority other, all of them assume the status of natives vis-a-vis the representatives of a central (often formerly colonial or quasi-colonial) government from the outside; and all of them find themselves in positions of relative weakness as a result of an asymmetrical power structure, often the consequence of technological inferiority.’

Mark Elliott, The case of the missing indigene: debate over a second-generation ethnic policy’, The China Journal, 2015, 73:207.

Throughout this report and our website, we’ve used the terms indigenous’, ethnic minority’ and nationality’ interchangeably to gloss the term minzu, depending on the context. When we refer to the Uyghurs generically, we’re also referring to other Turkic communities in Xinjiang: the Kazakhs, Tajiks, Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks who have also been targeted in China’s crackdown in Xinjiang.

comment = A technical argument over the definition of ‘indigene’ is mixed with subjective judgments such as “relative weakness as a result of an asymmetrical power structure”. The footnote does not clarify, stating:

“When we refer to the Uyghurs generically, we’re also referring to other Turkic communities in Xinjiang: the Kazakhs, Tajiks, Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks who have also been targeted in China’s crackdown in Xinjiang.“

This means the authors are free to frame inter-ethnic relations as they please, without qualification. This leads to a premise for their ‘repression’ narrative that uses constructs such as ‘Han’ as if they were real and essential characteristics of people, not convenient labels. The extension of this premise is the concept of ‘settler colonialism’ by ‘Han’ – a dangerous concept that sails very close to the racist concept of Replacement Theory, where the ‘other’ is alleged to be attempting an ‘invasion’. Incidentally, this is the rationale that Tarrant used in his manifesto as ‘justification’ for the execution of 52 Muslims in NZ.

 

Categories
Academic integrity Anti-China Narratives Modes of propaganda Replacement theory

Occasional shorts – #2

@ASPI_org has produced a new report called “The architecture of repression” by Xu @xu_xiuzhong, Leibold @jleibold and Daria Impiombato. I will be analysing this document in the next few weeks. Here’s another taster.

Reference 22

title = Settler colonialism and the path toward cultural genocide in Xinjiang,

context = International experts agree that Uyghur militants exist in Syria and Pakistan in small numbers, but argue that they pose little direct security threat to China.21 That view is widely rejected inside China, where a mix of racial discrimination, settler-colonialism and an irrational fear of instability has driven Xinjiang policy in recent times.22

note = Michael Clarke, ‘Settler colonialism and the path toward cultural genocide in Xinjiang’, in Adrian Gallagher, Charles T Hunt, Cecilia Jacob (eds), Global responsibility to protect, Brill, Leiden, 2021;

comment = It is interesting to note Clarke’s change in language from 2007 to the present. In China’s Internal Security Dilemma and the Great Western Development: The Dynamics of Integration, Ethnic Nationalism and Terrorism in Xinjiang , the situation in Xinjiang was described as a ‘dilemma‘ which now becomes ‘cultural genocide‘, ‘in-migration‘ (usually recognised as ‘internal migration’ by geographers) becomes ‘settler colonialism‘, ‘ inter-ethnic relations‘ becomes ‘cultural genocide‘.

Clearly, Clarke is attempting to align his language with the dominant culture of academia in general where anti-China sentiment is high. Notably, Clarke is entirely sceptical about terrorism claims by China, with the majority of the usage of the term ‘terrorism’ in inverted commas indicating irony.

Like many of his peers, Clarke is unwilling or unable to acknowledge the lived experience of those members of Islam majority countries which have experienced bullying, intimidation, physical violence or homicide at the hands of extremists.