Category: Deradicalisation

Categories
Academic integrity Deradicalisation Replacement theory

Occasional shorts – #3

@ASPI_org has produced a new report called “The architecture of repression” by Xu @xu_xiuzhong, Leibold @jleibold and Daria Impiombato. I will be analysing this document in the next few weeks.

Also checkout my previous shorts. Occasional shorts – #1 and Occasional shorts – #2 where I deconstruct Michael Clarke’s contributions to the repression narrative and his indulgence in Replacement Theory.

Reference 1

title = The case of the missing indigene: debate over a second-generation ethnic policy

context = indigenous groups1

note =  (long) The Chinese party-state officially recognises 56 minzu groups in China: a single Han majority and 55 numerically much smaller groups that currently make up nearly 9% of China’s population. The term minzu is deeply polysemic and notoriously difficult to translate. Depending on the context of its use, the term can connote concepts similar to nation, race, people and ethnicity in English. Party officials initially used the English term ‘nationality’ to render the term into English. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the party gradually pivoted away from ‘nationality’, preferring the term ‘ethnic minorities’ for the non-Han groups and reserving the term ‘nation’ for the collective identity and name of the Chinese nation-race’. See James Leibold, The minzu net: China’s fragmented national form,’ Nations and Nationalism, 2016, 22(3):425-428.

While party officials reject any assertion of indigeneity in China, Harvard historian Mark Elliott argues that China’s non-Han peoples are better thought of as indigenous communities rather than as ‘ethnic minorities’, which is a term widely used to refer to migrant populations in places such Canada or Australia, as these groups:

continue to live on lands to which they have reasonably strong ancestral claims; in their encounter with the majority other, all of them assume the status of natives vis-a-vis the representatives of a central (often formerly colonial or quasi-colonial) government from the outside; and all of them find themselves in positions of relative weakness as a result of an asymmetrical power structure, often the consequence of technological inferiority.’

Mark Elliott, The case of the missing indigene: debate over a second-generation ethnic policy’, The China Journal, 2015, 73:207.

Throughout this report and our website, we’ve used the terms indigenous’, ethnic minority’ and nationality’ interchangeably to gloss the term minzu, depending on the context. When we refer to the Uyghurs generically, we’re also referring to other Turkic communities in Xinjiang: the Kazakhs, Tajiks, Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks who have also been targeted in China’s crackdown in Xinjiang.

comment = A technical argument over the definition of ‘indigene’ is mixed with subjective judgments such as “relative weakness as a result of an asymmetrical power structure”. The footnote does not clarify, stating:

“When we refer to the Uyghurs generically, we’re also referring to other Turkic communities in Xinjiang: the Kazakhs, Tajiks, Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks who have also been targeted in China’s crackdown in Xinjiang.“

This means the authors are free to frame inter-ethnic relations as they please, without qualification. This leads to a premise for their ‘repression’ narrative that uses constructs such as ‘Han’ as if they were real and essential characteristics of people, not convenient labels. The extension of this premise is the concept of ‘settler colonialism’ by ‘Han’ – a dangerous concept that sails very close to the racist concept of Replacement Theory, where the ‘other’ is alleged to be attempting an ‘invasion’. Incidentally, this is the rationale that Tarrant used in his manifesto as ‘justification’ for the execution of 52 Muslims in NZ.

 

Categories
Deradicalisation Modes of propaganda Terror

Occasional shorts – #1

@ASPI_org has produced a new report called “The architecture of repression” by Xu, Leibold & Daria Impiombato. I will be analysing this document in the next few weeks. Here’s a taster.

Reference 21.
Context

International experts agree that Uyghur militants exist in Syria and Pakistan in small numbers, but argue that they pose little direct security threat to China. 21

Note

Michael Clarke, ‘China’s “war on terrorism”’, in Michael Clarke (ed.), Terrorism and counter-terrorism in China: domestic and foreign policy dimensions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018.

Comment

Apart from the vague “international experts agree”, not appropriate for any kind of scholarly or serious report, Clarke is not a terrorism or counter-terrorism expert. His expertise is history, which does not necessarily lend itself to understanding the practical problems with implementation of anti-terror programs.

He has no experience in security issues, nor has he served in a police service. He is also not an expert in surveillance or deradicalisation. It is doubtful that he has engaged with the lived experience of moderate Muslims who have been silenced, bullied, harassed and killed by extremists. (See interview with K in Beyond deradicalisation centres – Beijing takes a holistic and rational approach to poverty alleviation in which this lived experience is described after an interview with K)

Thus, his opinion is irrelevant and can be disregarded.

Additionally, his recent article, quoted here, is contradicted by his own words in 2017

https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/bloody-isis-video-puts-china-in-cross-hairs

“It appears to be the ISIS group’s “first direct threat” against China, Dr. Michael Clarke, an expert on Xinjiang at the National Security College of Australian National University, told AFP. “It is the first time that Uighur-speaking militants have claimed allegiance to IS,” he added, referring to the group by its other name.

 

The video showed China is now “very firmly a target of jihadist rhetoric,” Clarke said, marking a shift from years past when it rarely figured in statements by global militant groups.

 

But Clarke said it also could indicate a possible split among Uighur fighters, as it includes a warning to those fighting with the Al Qaeda-aligned Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) in Syria.” Clarke said the hints of a Uighur split could “intensify the threat to China” as it indicates Uighur militants may be able to tap into the capabilities of both ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

Like so many of the references in this document, the full work of the source author is not considered. Clarke has, in the past, completely contradicted the claim in the report, but, like so many academics, has changed his ‘tune’.

Categories
Deradicalisation

Beyond deradicalisation centres – Beijing takes a wholistic and rational approach to poverty alleviation – Part 2

Terror, religion and fascist ideologies

In the previous part of this 6-part series, I discussed the religious context in which Zenz and I grew up. Clearly, Zenz is still trapped within this context, whereas I made a break from this in my late teens, as did so many of my fellow religious travellers.

It would be easy to simply dismiss religion as inherently fascist and thus the enemy of any socialist, communist or collectivist movement. But this flies in the face of what is demonstrably true – that most people have religious practice as a kind of conventional behaviour not entirely different to how they choose to eat or engage in singing and dancing.

Religion is demonstrably a cultural artefact. It both informs cultural expression and is modified by it. In general, it is benign and pedestrian. But, at times, where political aspirations and exclusivity become its aim, religion takes on a markedly fascist flavour.

I wanted to understand how being Muslim in an Muslim majority Asian country might be like. This is important to gauge whether the influence of Wahhabism had some impact on Xinjiang and the unrest that eventually forced China into a de-radicalisation program after terror attacks.

An interview with K

For this series, I interviewed a native Indonesian from Java, a woman in her 50s who I will call K (to preserve her privacy). K grew up in a Muslim family and converted to Christianity in her early adulthood. She describes her religion, and its Indonesian expression as “moderate”. Growing up Muslim did not really seem extraordinary to her – she did feel there were obligations, but largely, in her view, Indonesians Muslims are free to express their Islamic faith as they see fit. Men have more obligations than women, especially in regard to mosque attendance and observance of various festivals, such as Ramadan.

In her culture, K did not really feel any ‘pressure’ from outside her family for ‘compliance’. She and her parents and siblings discussed issues but nobody felt forced to act in any particular way. Her faith was almost entirely conventional, rather than ideological. Her conversion to Christianity did not draw criticism from her family or community.

K was aware that Indonesian Islamic practices were quite separate from other expressions, in nearby Malaysia and the more distant Middle East Arabic countries. By and large, differences in practice were considered part of the Indonesian (or Javanese) tradition. Even then, the practices across various kinds of Islam were also varied, but considered as normal.

The emergence of the oil rich Arab countries towards the end of last century created some noticeable effects in Indonesian society. Arab countries had a new set of rich who looked for domestic employees or cheap labour. As citizens of a nation still developing, many Indonesians, especially those who came from poor villages, found ‘lucrative’ employment in Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. Many of these employees were able to send back to their villages what amounted to a ‘small fortune’ and were able to build houses and provide accommodation and support to their village in a way that is typically Indonesian.

In moving to these Arab countries, moderate Muslims were required to adopt far stricter Islamic practices related to modest dress, wearing of beards for young men, Qur’anic study, prayer, chaperoning of young woman,  women confined to home, deference to men for women, strict observance of halal and cleanliness rituals. In other words, they adopted what K, somewhat derisively, described as Islam of ‘Arabic fanatics’.

Returning to their villages, these people continued to practice Islam in the new way and, because of their influence as respected financiers of the village, were able to impose these practices on others. Extreme versions of Islam have a missionary zeal in regard to their faith and this was a new “irritating” version of Islam for the generally moderate population of Indonesia. But, as K observed, Indonesian Muslims did not accept this invasion and there was significant ‘push back’ against a variety of Islam considered ‘foreign’.

Intrusive verses lived religion

Although K’s story canvassed the last 50 years, she made a special note that significant influences were most noticeable in the past 10 years. In conversations with my brother, who has worked across Central, East and South East Asia in his professional capacity, this intrusive version of Islam has gained significant ground across Asia, notably in Malaysia.

This is also confirmed by R, a school friend who has lived in Malaysia for 40 years and laments what he considers the debasing of Islam in recent years, often by outsiders, often rich Arabic tourists. For him, radical Islam was and is becoming a way of asserting Malay nationalism in a country with significant colonial baggage.

It is worth calling out some kinds of ‘Islam’ as essentially fascist. They are not ‘Islamic’ in the sense that most Muslims would understand their lived faith, but an intrusive invasion of cultural expression. I will discuss, in the next part, how this kind of fascist religious expression can radicalise a group and set them on a path of collision with local, provincial and national authority.

But, before that, one should return to the inherent fascism of the religious cult in which Zenz and I were immersed.

The Bible and the Sword

It is easy to understand, by reading the history of most European colonial endeavours, that religion gave a rationale for some of the most horrific atrocities that humans have known. Not only was the Bible and cross the symbol of the ‘righteous’ genocide in the Americas, or the driver for missionary conquests of ‘primitive’ cultures, but, through progressively more exclusive interpretations, primed the German people to believe that “Jews crucified Christ”. No doubt, martyrs like Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who attempted to assassinate Hitler, took inspiration from their faith, so drawing some causal line between religion and atrocities is fraught.

The role that religion plays, for both Zenz and the radicalisers who created social unrest in Xinjiang, is as a kind of external justification. Fascism thrives in an environment of ‘paradise lost’ – some supposed and often highly fictionalised past is brought to bear on the current situation and all misfortune becomes the fault of those who have “abandoned God in unbelief”. For radical ‘Christianity’, the intense focus on separation from worldliness leads to condemnation of religious liturgy, homosexuality, scientific understanding, openness to different values, sex work, ‘adultery’, ‘illicit sex’, gender variation, cultural expression in art, eating and drinking practices, roles of men and women, dress … such a multitude of cultural norms become the object of hate and the identification of the ‘faithful’ determined by how well they subscribe to the exclusivity of the practices and attitudes.

Radical extremist ‘Islam’ follows a similar path.

The relationship to terror

At its worst, the underlying quest for control and power by the leaders within both Christian and Islamic sects turns to violence, usually targeting those who are considered ‘traitors’ to their religion. Some of the worst terror attacks occur among people of the same religions.

While the world was fixated on the Charlie Hebdo shootings and masses turned out on the streets in solidarity, the Boko Haram attack on the town of Baga in northern Nigeria,  killing at least 200 people, uncovered around the same date, was largely ignored in the world’s media, noted by the then progressive Guardian “Why did the world ignore Boko Haram’s Baga attacks?”

This table gives some notion of the extent of this religiously justified terror just in Africa in just that year. (note: this excludes at least half of the casualties of extremist ‘Islamic’ activity in 2015 in other countries)

Cameroon Jul-13 2 suicide bombers explode in a bar in the town of Fotokol and kill 13 people, including a soldier from Chad who was killed in the second explosion. 15
Cameroon Jul-26 A suicide bomber kills at least 14 people at a popular nightclub in Maruoa, just three days after 2 suicide bombers killed 20 people in the same town. 15
Cameroon Nov-21 Suicide bombers affiliated with Boko Haram kill at least 10 in northern Cameroon. 10
Chad Oct-10 Multiple suicide bombings in Chad killed 33 people and injured 51. The attack is believed to be the work of Boko Haram. 33
Chad Dec-05 Four female suicide bombers from the militant Islamist group Boko Haram attacked the Chadian island of Koulfoua on Lake Chad, killing at least 15 people and injuring 130. 19
Egypt Oct-31 Bomb on board a Russian jet brings it down in Sinai, bound for St Petersburg, killing 224 people. 224
Egypt Nov-24 In the November 2015 Sinai attack which occurred a day after the second round of parliamentary elections closed, militants attack a hotel housing election judges in the provincial capital of al-Arish in Egypt’s North Sinai. 7 dead, 10+ wounded 7
Egypt Nov-28 Islamist gunmen killed four security personnel in an attack at a police checkpoint in Saqqara. 4 dead 4
Egypt Dec-08 An explosive device by Islamists targeting a military convoy went off in Rafah. 4 dead 4 injured. 4
Kenya Apr-02 148 people – most of them Christian students – killed in Al-Shabaab’s Garissa University College attack before Easter weekend Holidays.[96 148
Kenya May-26 Al-Shabaab militants attacked two police patrols which turned into a gun battle north of Garissa, 5 police officers were injured but they were able to kill both of the attackers. 2
Libya Mar-25 ISIL affiliates, The Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries in Libya carried out suicide bombings in the city of Benghazi. Twelve were killed and 25 wounded. Five additional dead during attacks with a local militia 12
Libya May-21 A suicide bomber detonated his explosives at a military checkpoint outside of Misrata killing himself and two guards. 3
Mali Nov-28 Militants fired rockets on a MINUSMA peacekeeping forces base in northern Mali. Ansar Dine claimed responsibility. 3 dead, 20 wounded. 3
Niger Oct-28 Boko Haram militants attack a village in Niger, gunning down 13 people and allegedly burning down houses and cars during the rampage. 13
Niger Nov-25 Boko Haram invades a village and shoots indiscriminately residents and also fire rockets, killing 18. 18
Nigeria Jan-08 Jihadist Boko Haram attacked the town of Baga in northern Nigeria killing at least 200 people. Another 2,000 are unaccounted for 200
Nigeria Jun-26 Boko Haram kills at least 200 people as they gun down and bomb villages, mosques, and other public space. 200
Nigeria Jul-05 Two bombs explode at an elite restaurant and mosque, killing at least 15 people in Jos. 15
Nigeria Jul-07 A bomb explodes in a government office in Zaria, killing 20 people. 20
Nigeria Jul-17 Two Nigerian towns are attacked by two suicide bombers, killing 62 people. 62
Nigeria Jul-22 A series of explosions at two bus stations in Gombe kill about 40 people. 40
Nigeria Aug-11 47 people are killed as explosions erupt at a crowded market in the town of Sabon Gari. 47
Nigeria Aug-28 Boko Haram members massacre 79 people in 3 different Nigerian villages. 68 alone were killed in the village of Baanu. 79
Nigeria Sep-10 Explosion at a refugee camp for people fleeing Boko Haram kills at least 2. 2
Nigeria Sep-21 At least 54 people were killed by multiple explosions in Nigeria. 54
Nigeria Oct-01 Multiple suicide bombings by Boko Haram in North-East Nigeria killed 14 people (including the bombers) and injured 39. 14
Nigeria Oct-22 20 people were killed in the northeast state of Borno, Nigeria in a Boko Haram attack. 20
Nigeria Oct-23 Two separate mosques were attacked by suicide bombers, killing 42 in Nigeria. 42
Nigeria Nov-17 A suicide attack at a market in Yola killed more than 30 people and hospitalised more than 80. The attack is thought to be the work of Boko Haram. 30
Nigeria Nov-18 Two explosions rock a phone market in Kano killing at least 15 people and injuring more than 100. Boko Haram is suspected to be behind it. 15
Nigeria Nov-22 8 people among women and children demise when a female suicide bomber is reduced to pulp. 8
Nigeria Nov-27 21 killed in Boko Haram suicide attack on a Shia procession in Nigeria[citation ne 22
Nigeria Dec-13 Boko Haram Islamists, at least some using machetes, attacked residents of the villages of Warwara, Mangari, and Bura-Shika. 30 killed and 20 injured 30
Nigeria Dec-26 Boko Haram gunmen raided Kimba village in northern Nigeria, opening fire on residents and torching their homes. 14+ killed.[193] 14
Nigeria Dec-28 Fourteen Islamist female suicide bombers aged 12–18 attempted to simultaneously attack the city of Maiduguri. Seven of the bombers were shot dead by Nigerian forces while three managed to escape and detonate themselves in Baderi general area and near a Mosque, killing 26 people and wounding another 85. 36
Somalia Apr-20 A minivan of UN workers was bombed by Al-Shabaab in the Puntland region of Somalia. 9 dead 4 injured. 9
Somalia Oct-07 Militants of Al-Shabaab ambushed and killed the nephew of Somalia’s president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. 2 dead. 2
Syria Dec-11 In the Tell Tamer bombings three truck bombs by ISIL killed up to 60 people and injured more than 80 in the town of Tell Tamer. 60
Tunisia Mar-18 Bardo National Museum attack. Militants linked to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) attack the Bardo National Museum with guns, killing 21 people and injuring around 50 21
Tunisia Jun-26 2015 Sousse attacks – A gunman, named Seifeddine Rezgui, attacked a hotel targeting the European tourists staying there. 38
Tunisia Nov-24 At least 14 people were killed in a bus bombing in Tunis, the capital of Tunisia. ISIL claimed responsibility for this attack that targeted a bus transporting members of the Presidential Guard. 14
Total 1624

To anyone engaged with global events and geopolitics, these figures are not remarkable, even if they are horrific. From 2013, the explosion of attacks, not on western targets, but within Islamic majority areas, clearly signalled an issue that the world needed to come to grips with.

The range of responses from around the world has already been touched upon, but the focus on the next part of this series will be Xinjiang in China and the deradicalisation project that occurred there.