Replacement theory – Heaven's Other Mandate

@ASPI_org has produced a new report called “The architecture of repression” by Xu @xu_xiuzhong, Leibold @jleibold and Daria Impiombato. I will be analysing this document in the next few weeks.

Also checkout my previous shorts. Occasional shorts – #1 and Occasional shorts – #2 where I deconstruct Michael Clarke’s contributions to the repression narrative and his indulgence in Replacement Theory.

Reference 1

title = The case of the missing indigene: debate over a second-generation ethnic policy

context = indigenous groups¹

note = (long) The Chinese party-state officially recognises 56 minzu groups in China: a single Han majority and 55 numerically much smaller groups that currently make up nearly 9% of China’s population. The term minzu is deeply polysemic and notoriously difficult to translate. Depending on the context of its use, the term can connote concepts similar to nation, race, people and ethnicity in English. Party officials initially used the English term ‘nationality’ to render the term into English. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the party gradually pivoted away from ‘nationality’, preferring the term ‘ethnic minorities’ for the non-Han groups and reserving the term ‘nation’ for the collective identity and name of the Chinese nation-race’. See James Leibold, The minzu net: China’s fragmented national form,’ Nations and Nationalism, 2016, 22(3):425-428.

While party officials reject any assertion of indigeneity in China, Harvard historian Mark Elliott argues that China’s non-Han peoples are better thought of as indigenous communities rather than as ‘ethnic minorities’, which is a term widely used to refer to migrant populations in places such Canada or Australia, as these groups:

continue to live on lands to which they have reasonably strong ancestral claims; in their encounter with the majority other, all of them assume the status of natives vis-a-vis the representatives of a central (often formerly colonial or quasi-colonial) government from the outside; and all of them find themselves in positions of relative weakness as a result of an asymmetrical power structure, often the consequence of technological inferiority.’

Mark Elliott, The case of the missing indigene: debate over a second-generation ethnic policy’, The China Journal, 2015, 73:207.

Throughout this report and our website, we’ve used the terms indigenous’, ethnic minority’ and nationality’ interchangeably to gloss the term minzu, depending on the context. When we refer to the Uyghurs generically, we’re also referring to other Turkic communities in Xinjiang: the Kazakhs, Tajiks, Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks who have also been targeted in China’s crackdown in Xinjiang.

comment = A technical argument over the definition of ‘indigene’ is mixed with subjective judgments such as “relative weakness as a result of an asymmetrical power structure”. The footnote does not clarify, stating:

“When we refer to the Uyghurs generically, we’re also referring to other Turkic communities in Xinjiang: the Kazakhs, Tajiks, Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks who have also been targeted in China’s crackdown in Xinjiang.“

This means the authors are free to frame inter-ethnic relations as they please, without qualification. This leads to a premise for their ‘repression’ narrative that uses constructs such as ‘Han’ as if they were real and essential characteristics of people, not convenient labels. The extension of this premise is the concept of ‘settler colonialism’ by ‘Han’ – a dangerous concept that sails very close to the racist concept of Replacement Theory, where the ‘other’ is alleged to be attempting an ‘invasion’. Incidentally, this is the rationale that Tarrant used in his manifesto as ‘justification’ for the execution of 52 Muslims in NZ.

@ASPI_org has produced a new report called “The architecture of repression” by Xu @xu_xiuzhong, Leibold @jleibold and Daria Impiombato. I will be analysing this document in the next few weeks. Here’s another taster.

Reference 22

title = Settler colonialism and the path toward cultural genocide in Xinjiang,

context = International experts agree that Uyghur militants exist in Syria and Pakistan in small numbers, but argue that they pose little direct security threat to China.²¹ That view is widely rejected inside China, where a mix of racial discrimination, settler-colonialism and an irrational fear of instability has driven Xinjiang policy in recent times.²²

note = Michael Clarke, ‘Settler colonialism and the path toward cultural genocide in Xinjiang’, in Adrian Gallagher, Charles T Hunt, Cecilia Jacob (eds), Global responsibility to protect, Brill, Leiden, 2021;

comment = It is interesting to note Clarke’s change in language from 2007 to the present. In China’s Internal Security Dilemma and the Great Western Development: The Dynamics of Integration, Ethnic Nationalism and Terrorism in Xinjiang , the situation in Xinjiang was described as a ‘dilemma‘ which now becomes ‘cultural genocide‘, ‘in-migration‘ (usually recognised as ‘internal migration’ by geographers) becomes ‘settler colonialism‘, ‘ inter-ethnic relations‘ becomes ‘cultural genocide‘.

Clearly, Clarke is attempting to align his language with the dominant culture of academia in general where anti-China sentiment is high. Notably, Clarke is entirely sceptical about terrorism claims by China, with the majority of the usage of the term ‘terrorism’ in inverted commas indicating irony.

Like many of his peers, Clarke is unwilling or unable to acknowledge the lived experience of those members of Islam majority countries which have experienced bullying, intimidation, physical violence or homicide at the hands of extremists.