Terror, religion and fascist ideologies
In the previous part of this 6-part series, I discussed the religious context in which Zenz and I grew up. Clearly, Zenz is still trapped within this context, whereas I made a break from this in my late teens, as did so many of my fellow religious travellers.
It would be easy to simply dismiss religion as inherently fascist and thus the enemy of any socialist, communist or collectivist movement. But this flies in the face of what is demonstrably true – that most people have religious practice as a kind of conventional behaviour not entirely different to how they choose to eat or engage in singing and dancing.
Religion is demonstrably a cultural artefact. It both informs cultural expression and is modified by it. In general, it is benign and pedestrian. But, at times, where political aspirations and exclusivity become its aim, religion takes on a markedly fascist flavour.
I wanted to understand how being Muslim in an Muslim majority Asian country might be like. This is important to gauge whether the influence of Wahhabism had some impact on Xinjiang and the unrest that eventually forced China into a de-radicalisation program after terror attacks.
An interview with K
For this series, I interviewed a native Indonesian from Java, a woman in her 50s who I will call K (to preserve her privacy). K grew up in a Muslim family and converted to Christianity in her early adulthood. She describes her religion, and its Indonesian expression as “moderate”. Growing up Muslim did not really seem extraordinary to her – she did feel there were obligations, but largely, in her view, Indonesians Muslims are free to express their Islamic faith as they see fit. Men have more obligations than women, especially in regard to mosque attendance and observance of various festivals, such as Ramadan.
In her culture, K did not really feel any ‘pressure’ from outside her family for ‘compliance’. She and her parents and siblings discussed issues but nobody felt forced to act in any particular way. Her faith was almost entirely conventional, rather than ideological. Her conversion to Christianity did not draw criticism from her family or community.
K was aware that Indonesian Islamic practices were quite separate from other expressions, in nearby Malaysia and the more distant Middle East Arabic countries. By and large, differences in practice were considered part of the Indonesian (or Javanese) tradition. Even then, the practices across various kinds of Islam were also varied, but considered as normal.
The emergence of the oil rich Arab countries towards the end of last century created some noticeable effects in Indonesian society. Arab countries had a new set of rich who looked for domestic employees or cheap labour. As citizens of a nation still developing, many Indonesians, especially those who came from poor villages, found ‘lucrative’ employment in Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. Many of these employees were able to send back to their villages what amounted to a ‘small fortune’ and were able to build houses and provide accommodation and support to their village in a way that is typically Indonesian.
In moving to these Arab countries, moderate Muslims were required to adopt far stricter Islamic practices related to modest dress, wearing of beards for young men, Qur’anic study, prayer, chaperoning of young woman, women confined to home, deference to men for women, strict observance of halal and cleanliness rituals. In other words, they adopted what K, somewhat derisively, described as Islam of ‘Arabic fanatics’.
Returning to their villages, these people continued to practice Islam in the new way and, because of their influence as respected financiers of the village, were able to impose these practices on others. Extreme versions of Islam have a missionary zeal in regard to their faith and this was a new “irritating” version of Islam for the generally moderate population of Indonesia. But, as K observed, Indonesian Muslims did not accept this invasion and there was significant ‘push back’ against a variety of Islam considered ‘foreign’.
Intrusive verses lived religion
Although K’s story canvassed the last 50 years, she made a special note that significant influences were most noticeable in the past 10 years. In conversations with my brother, who has worked across Central, East and South East Asia in his professional capacity, this intrusive version of Islam has gained significant ground across Asia, notably in Malaysia.
This is also confirmed by R, a school friend who has lived in Malaysia for 40 years and laments what he considers the debasing of Islam in recent years, often by outsiders, often rich Arabic tourists. For him, radical Islam was and is becoming a way of asserting Malay nationalism in a country with significant colonial baggage.
It is worth calling out some kinds of ‘Islam’ as essentially fascist. They are not ‘Islamic’ in the sense that most Muslims would understand their lived faith, but an intrusive invasion of cultural expression. I will discuss, in the next part, how this kind of fascist religious expression can radicalise a group and set them on a path of collision with local, provincial and national authority.
But, before that, one should return to the inherent fascism of the religious cult in which Zenz and I were immersed.
The Bible and the Sword
It is easy to understand, by reading the history of most European colonial endeavours, that religion gave a rationale for some of the most horrific atrocities that humans have known. Not only was the Bible and cross the symbol of the ‘righteous’ genocide in the Americas, or the driver for missionary conquests of ‘primitive’ cultures, but, through progressively more exclusive interpretations, primed the German people to believe that “Jews crucified Christ”. No doubt, martyrs like Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who attempted to assassinate Hitler, took inspiration from their faith, so drawing some causal line between religion and atrocities is fraught.
The role that religion plays, for both Zenz and the radicalisers who created social unrest in Xinjiang, is as a kind of external justification. Fascism thrives in an environment of ‘paradise lost’ – some supposed and often highly fictionalised past is brought to bear on the current situation and all misfortune becomes the fault of those who have “abandoned God in unbelief”. For radical ‘Christianity’, the intense focus on separation from worldliness leads to condemnation of religious liturgy, homosexuality, scientific understanding, openness to different values, sex work, ‘adultery’, ‘illicit sex’, gender variation, cultural expression in art, eating and drinking practices, roles of men and women, dress … such a multitude of cultural norms become the object of hate and the identification of the ‘faithful’ determined by how well they subscribe to the exclusivity of the practices and attitudes.
Radical extremist ‘Islam’ follows a similar path.
The relationship to terror
At its worst, the underlying quest for control and power by the leaders within both Christian and Islamic sects turns to violence, usually targeting those who are considered ‘traitors’ to their religion. Some of the worst terror attacks occur among people of the same religions.
While the world was fixated on the Charlie Hebdo shootings and masses turned out on the streets in solidarity, the Boko Haram attack on the town of Baga in northern Nigeria, killing at least 200 people, uncovered around the same date, was largely ignored in the world’s media, noted by the then progressive Guardian “Why did the world ignore Boko Haram’s Baga attacks?”
This table gives some notion of the extent of this religiously justified terror just in Africa in just that year. (note: this excludes at least half of the casualties of extremist ‘Islamic’ activity in 2015 in other countries)
Cameroon | Jul-13 | 2 suicide bombers explode in a bar in the town of Fotokol and kill 13 people, including a soldier from Chad who was killed in the second explosion. | 15 |
Cameroon | Jul-26 | A suicide bomber kills at least 14 people at a popular nightclub in Maruoa, just three days after 2 suicide bombers killed 20 people in the same town. | 15 |
Cameroon | Nov-21 | Suicide bombers affiliated with Boko Haram kill at least 10 in northern Cameroon. | 10 |
Chad | Oct-10 | Multiple suicide bombings in Chad killed 33 people and injured 51. The attack is believed to be the work of Boko Haram. | 33 |
Chad | Dec-05 | Four female suicide bombers from the militant Islamist group Boko Haram attacked the Chadian island of Koulfoua on Lake Chad, killing at least 15 people and injuring 130. | 19 |
Egypt | Oct-31 | Bomb on board a Russian jet brings it down in Sinai, bound for St Petersburg, killing 224 people. | 224 |
Egypt | Nov-24 | In the November 2015 Sinai attack which occurred a day after the second round of parliamentary elections closed, militants attack a hotel housing election judges in the provincial capital of al-Arish in Egypt’s North Sinai. 7 dead, 10+ wounded | 7 |
Egypt | Nov-28 | Islamist gunmen killed four security personnel in an attack at a police checkpoint in Saqqara. 4 dead | 4 |
Egypt | Dec-08 | An explosive device by Islamists targeting a military convoy went off in Rafah. 4 dead 4 injured. | 4 |
Kenya | Apr-02 | 148 people – most of them Christian students – killed in Al-Shabaab’s Garissa University College attack before Easter weekend Holidays.[96 | 148 |
Kenya | May-26 | Al-Shabaab militants attacked two police patrols which turned into a gun battle north of Garissa, 5 police officers were injured but they were able to kill both of the attackers. | 2 |
Libya | Mar-25 | ISIL affiliates, The Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries in Libya carried out suicide bombings in the city of Benghazi. Twelve were killed and 25 wounded. Five additional dead during attacks with a local militia | 12 |
Libya | May-21 | A suicide bomber detonated his explosives at a military checkpoint outside of Misrata killing himself and two guards. | 3 |
Mali | Nov-28 | Militants fired rockets on a MINUSMA peacekeeping forces base in northern Mali. Ansar Dine claimed responsibility. 3 dead, 20 wounded. | 3 |
Niger | Oct-28 | Boko Haram militants attack a village in Niger, gunning down 13 people and allegedly burning down houses and cars during the rampage. | 13 |
Niger | Nov-25 | Boko Haram invades a village and shoots indiscriminately residents and also fire rockets, killing 18. | 18 |
Nigeria | Jan-08 | Jihadist Boko Haram attacked the town of Baga in northern Nigeria killing at least 200 people. Another 2,000 are unaccounted for | 200 |
Nigeria | Jun-26 | Boko Haram kills at least 200 people as they gun down and bomb villages, mosques, and other public space. | 200 |
Nigeria | Jul-05 | Two bombs explode at an elite restaurant and mosque, killing at least 15 people in Jos. | 15 |
Nigeria | Jul-07 | A bomb explodes in a government office in Zaria, killing 20 people. | 20 |
Nigeria | Jul-17 | Two Nigerian towns are attacked by two suicide bombers, killing 62 people. | 62 |
Nigeria | Jul-22 | A series of explosions at two bus stations in Gombe kill about 40 people. | 40 |
Nigeria | Aug-11 | 47 people are killed as explosions erupt at a crowded market in the town of Sabon Gari. | 47 |
Nigeria | Aug-28 | Boko Haram members massacre 79 people in 3 different Nigerian villages. 68 alone were killed in the village of Baanu. | 79 |
Nigeria | Sep-10 | Explosion at a refugee camp for people fleeing Boko Haram kills at least 2. | 2 |
Nigeria | Sep-21 | At least 54 people were killed by multiple explosions in Nigeria. | 54 |
Nigeria | Oct-01 | Multiple suicide bombings by Boko Haram in North-East Nigeria killed 14 people (including the bombers) and injured 39. | 14 |
Nigeria | Oct-22 | 20 people were killed in the northeast state of Borno, Nigeria in a Boko Haram attack. | 20 |
Nigeria | Oct-23 | Two separate mosques were attacked by suicide bombers, killing 42 in Nigeria. | 42 |
Nigeria | Nov-17 | A suicide attack at a market in Yola killed more than 30 people and hospitalised more than 80. The attack is thought to be the work of Boko Haram. | 30 |
Nigeria | Nov-18 | Two explosions rock a phone market in Kano killing at least 15 people and injuring more than 100. Boko Haram is suspected to be behind it. | 15 |
Nigeria | Nov-22 | 8 people among women and children demise when a female suicide bomber is reduced to pulp. | 8 |
Nigeria | Nov-27 | 21 killed in Boko Haram suicide attack on a Shia procession in Nigeria[citation ne | 22 |
Nigeria | Dec-13 | Boko Haram Islamists, at least some using machetes, attacked residents of the villages of Warwara, Mangari, and Bura-Shika. 30 killed and 20 injured | 30 |
Nigeria | Dec-26 | Boko Haram gunmen raided Kimba village in northern Nigeria, opening fire on residents and torching their homes. 14+ killed.[193] | 14 |
Nigeria | Dec-28 | Fourteen Islamist female suicide bombers aged 12–18 attempted to simultaneously attack the city of Maiduguri. Seven of the bombers were shot dead by Nigerian forces while three managed to escape and detonate themselves in Baderi general area and near a Mosque, killing 26 people and wounding another 85. | 36 |
Somalia | Apr-20 | A minivan of UN workers was bombed by Al-Shabaab in the Puntland region of Somalia. 9 dead 4 injured. | 9 |
Somalia | Oct-07 | Militants of Al-Shabaab ambushed and killed the nephew of Somalia’s president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. 2 dead. | 2 |
Syria | Dec-11 | In the Tell Tamer bombings three truck bombs by ISIL killed up to 60 people and injured more than 80 in the town of Tell Tamer. | 60 |
Tunisia | Mar-18 | Bardo National Museum attack. Militants linked to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) attack the Bardo National Museum with guns, killing 21 people and injuring around 50 | 21 |
Tunisia | Jun-26 | 2015 Sousse attacks – A gunman, named Seifeddine Rezgui, attacked a hotel targeting the European tourists staying there. | 38 |
Tunisia | Nov-24 | At least 14 people were killed in a bus bombing in Tunis, the capital of Tunisia. ISIL claimed responsibility for this attack that targeted a bus transporting members of the Presidential Guard. | 14 |
Total | 1624 |
To anyone engaged with global events and geopolitics, these figures are not remarkable, even if they are horrific. From 2013, the explosion of attacks, not on western targets, but within Islamic majority areas, clearly signalled an issue that the world needed to come to grips with.
The range of responses from around the world has already been touched upon, but the focus on the next part of this series will be Xinjiang in China and the deradicalisation project that occurred there.